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ANY NUMBER YOU WANT?  
THE IMPACT OF DATA CLEANING 
ON INTERNAL VALIDITY      
By Aidan Wilcox
    
Abstract  
Concerns about the internal validity of reconviction studies tend to focus on factors 
such as initial comparability of groups. Often overlooked is the impact that data 
preparation can have. Data preparation refers to the decisions taken by researchers 
regarding which offenders to retain in the sample for analysis. Using data relating to 
a sample of offenders in two police forces, it is shown that these decisions, even when 
applied equally to both groups, can impact differentially on reconviction rates, 
weakening a study s internal validity. Implications of the findings are considered and 
recommendations made to improve the transparency of the process.     
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In recent years the government has expressed a commitment to be guided by the 
evidence in criminal justice policy-making (e.g. Blunkett 2000), and this has come to 
be known as the what works approach (in contrast to the nothing works pessimism 
of the 1970s and 1980s). What the government means by what works is whether an 
intervention or policy successfully reduces crime, whether at the level of society, 
community or the individual. For interventions that seek to reduce crime by targeting 
individuals (rather than places, as in situational crime prevention), the reconviction 
study is the methodology of choice when it comes to assessing the question has it 
worked? i The present what works era, which arguably began in 1998 (Wilcox 2005), 
has been characterised by a significant increase in both funding for programmes 
aimed at changing offending behaviour,ii and reconviction studies commissioned to 
test their effectiveness.iii   
As in any type of evaluation, a key concern for those commissioning and using 
research has been the strength of the research design. There are several criteria against 
which a research study could be judged; for example in the quality of the reporting of 
its data (descriptive validity), the generalisability of its findings (external validity) or 
the extent to which operational definitions of variables adequately reflect their 
theoretical constructs (construct validity) (Farrington 2002). However, for research 
which aims to ascertain whether an intervention (e.g. restorative justice) has reduced 
reconviction rates, internal validity is the prime concern. Internal validity addresses 
the truth of the question as to whether the intervention caused the outcome (Cook and 
Campbell 1979). In other words an internally valid reconviction study is one which is 
able to demonstrate a cause-effect relationship. In order to establish such a 
relationship, the researcher must be able to rule out plausible alternative explanations 
for the outcome, which are known as threats to validity.   
It is worth briefly explicating the different threats to internal validity before 
considering how data cleaning might pose such a threat. Let us assume that a 
reconviction study involves, as a minimum, a treatment or intervention (for example, 
restorative cautioning), an outcome measure (in this case reconviction), and some 
form of comparison between different treatment conditions in order to allow an 
inference about the treatment to be drawn. Bias can be introduced to the results due to 
initial non-comparability of the groups, methods of analysis, or through attrition 
which is explained in-depth below. Specifically, the main threats to validity are as 
follows: iv  
History. One way in which groups may differ is in their exposure to events other than 
the intervention, in which case, it may be that this history event may be responsible 
for any observed differences in outcome, rather than the intervention itself (Cook and 
Campbell 1979). For example, if one were evaluating the impact of an anger 
management programme by comparing reconviction rates of prisoners from one 
prison where the programme was available, and a second prison where it was not, it 
may be that other characteristics of the two prisons (e.g. ethos, staffing levels) were 
responsible for any differences in reconviction rates.   




Maturation. Whereas history refers to a particular event which groups may encounter, 
maturation concerns normal, developmental processes occurring within them 
(Trochim 2000). We know from criminal career research (e.g. Farrington 1997), that 
offending is not constant throughout the life course, and tends to increase in late 
adolescence and decline through the twenties. It would be a maturation threat to 
validity, therefore, if individuals in the comparison and intervention groups were at 
different stages of their criminal careers.   
Regression. Regression simply means that left to themselves things tend to return to 
normal. An individual s involvement in offending tends to oscillate, such that periods 
of high offending are generally followed by lower rates of offending, regardless of 
any outside intervention (Maltz 1984). Treatment and comparison groups may 
experience different rates of regression to the mean simply because they were at 
different stages of this cycle to begin with, rather than because the intervention 
worked.   
Instrumentation. There may be more than one way to measure the outcome of interest. 
If different measures (instruments) are used for the intervention and comparison 
groups, then differences in outcome may be due to differences in the test rather than 
to the intervention itself. The two main sources of reconviction data are the Offenders 
Index (OI) and the Police National Computer (PNC) and they are known to vary in 
their completeness and accuracy (Francis, Crosland and Harman 2002). In the 
(admittedly unlikely event) that the OI were used to calculate a reconviction rate for 
the intervention group, while the PNC were used for the comparison group, this could 
threaten the internal validity of the study.  
Attrition. Intervention attritionv generally refers to loss of cases in a study due to 
participants dropping out of the intervention, the danger being that those who drop out 
differ in some significant way from those who do not. For example, those who drop 
out of an anger management programme may be less motivated to desist from crime 
than those who attend. If rates of intervention attrition differ between intervention and 
comparison groups, it would be misleading to compare reconviction rates only of 
those who completed (Farrington 2002). One can protect against this attrition threat 
by including in the analysis all those originally assigned to the intervention and the 
comparison groups when comparing reconviction rates.vi However, the higher the rate 
of intervention attrition, the harder it becomes to detect a statistically significant effect 
of the intervention (if one exists).   
There is a second type of attrition, which I term data attrition (Wilcox 2005), in 
which individuals are excluded from the study by the researchers, due to concerns 
about the accuracy of the data held on them. As in intervention attrition, it is possible 
that those excluded have different characteristics from those included. However, 
because they are excluded from the analysis, one cannot calculate their reconviction 
rate. Thus there is no way to guard against the threat to validity that data attrition 
poses (except to try to minimise its extent in the first place). It is this second type of 
attrition which is the concern of this article, and it is explained further below.    
Social interaction threats. Due to the fact that social research involves reflexive 
human beings, interactions between them (e.g. between offender and probation 
officer) may lead to differences in outcome not directly related to the intervention 




itself (Cook and Campbell 1979). Resentful demoralisation or compensatory rivalry 
may result if one group becomes aware that it is receiving a less favourable treatment 
than another. Alternatively those involved with providing the less favourable 
treatment may try to compensate the offenders in some way. Such social interaction 
threats have been observed in a number of criminological experiments (e.g. Clarke 
and Cornish 1972).   
The threats to internal validity are well known, and the seminal work of Cook and 
Campbell (1979) regarding social science research has been updated for 
criminological research (e.g. Farrington 2002). This has been accompanied by 
encouragement from the Home Office and other funding bodies to evaluators to adopt 
a more experimental approach. In their research standards for reconviction studies, the 
Home Office emphasises the importance of ensuring comparability between 
intervention and comparison groups (Home Office 2004). However, what is notable in 
both the academic literature and official documentation is that the possibility that data 
attrition may affect internal validity is not mentioned. This is perhaps because it is 
perceived as unlikely; in order to threaten internal validity the procedures for cleaning 
data would have to result in different rates of attrition (and reconviction) in the two 
groups. The assumption has been that as long as the same procedures are adopted for 
both groups this will not happen. The reasonableness of this assumption is tested in 
this article.  
One of the reasons for conducting this research was that the possibility that data 
cleaning could affect internal validity had been raised by an evaluator I interviewed as 
part of my doctoral research (Wilcox 2005). In the interview she noted that the 
decisions she had taken regarding data cleaning affected the overall reconviction rate:  
In the [ ] study I had six categories of cases, according to how sure I was 
about the accuracy of the match. I could have had any number in the final 
sample depending on which matching criteria were applied and I found they 
all gave different [reconviction] rates.vii   
Given that it is possible for data cleaning to affect reconviction rates, the question is 
whether it can do so differentially between groups, thus undermining internal validity. 
Before explaining how this question was addressed, further explanation is needed 
about data cleaning.   




What is meant by data cleaning?  
Data cleaning is the process by which the researcher decides which cases to keep in 
the final sample. This is based on the degree to which the cases appear to be accurate. 
For those unfamiliar with reconviction data, it might seem strange that the data need 
any cleaning or preparation before the statistical analysis can be carried out. It is 
worth, therefore, explaining briefly where reconviction data come from, and the 
potential sources of inaccuracy in them.   
As mentioned above, the two main sources of reconviction data are the Offenders 
Index and the PNC. The process of obtaining the data are similar in both cases, in that 
researchers need to provide certain identifying variables, including the offender s 
name, gender and date of birth so that they can be traced. The reconviction data which 
are returned are messy and complex, reflecting the reality of offenders criminal 
careers. In the raw output from the OI or PNC, each offence for which someone is 
convicted or cautioned results in one row on a spreadsheet, containing details of the 
offence and disposal.viii Depending on how many offences they have been sanctioned 
for, an offender may have anything from one to several hundred rows of data. One of 
the main tasks of the researcher is to identify from this reconviction history, the 
offence (known as the target offence) which led to the intervention of interest. The 
researcher will already have from their own records (perhaps from a probation file) 
the date of the target conviction or caution, and what type of offence it was for. The 
question is whether this information matches up with the details of convictions as 
recorded in the OI or PNC. Data cleaning, therefore, relates to this process of deciding 
whether the two sets of data match up; if they do the offender is kept in the sample, if 
not then a decision has to be made as to whether to exclude them. In an ideal world, of 
course, PNC and OI records would coincide exactly with the data held by researchers. 
In practice, there are often discrepancies (as there are between the OI and PNC). In 
the section which follows, the ways in which data could be cleaned are explained.   





In order to test the effect of data preparation on reconviction rates a random sample of 
1000 intervention and 1000 comparison group cases from an evaluation of restorative 
cautions conducted by the author and colleagues (Wilcox, Young and Hoyle 2004) 
was selected.ix The cases were taken from the original reconviction data file sent by 
the Home Office, i.e. they had not yet been cleaned or prepared in any way. The file 
contained only those cases which Home Office staff had been able to trace on the 
PNC on the basis of the identifiers sent to them.x It was decided to select 1000 cases 
for each group as this would provide sufficient numbers for the different methods of 
data preparation to be carried out, and yet would be small enough so that the data 
could be prepared manually where needed (i.e. without the use of syntax).xi  The 
dataset was anonymised by removing the names of the offenders. As mentioned in 
footnote 9, PNC data contain over 30 variables, most of which were irrelevant for the 
purposes of the current study (e.g. court at which offender was sentenced), and these 
were removed.   
When deciding which cases to retain for analysis, researchers generally compare the 
raw reconviction data provided by the Home Office to information about the offender 
that they have collected independently from other sources. In the case of the 
restorative cautioning study, the police forces had provided us, from their local files, 
with the date of caution for each offender. Thus in deciding which cases to retain for 
analysis, these dates were compared to the full criminal history as contained in the 
PNC. In the analysis that follows, reconviction rates refer to the proportion of 
offenders receiving a conviction for an offence occurring within the 12 months 
following the date of the target caution (i.e. the date of the offence is used in the 
calculation).xii   





The first calculation of reconviction rates is for offenders for whom we are most 
certain that the data are accurate. This is therefore based on offenders for whom the 
date of caution as recorded in the local police database exactly matches one of the 
dates of caution in their criminal history as recorded in the PNC. Adopting this 
criterion leaves us with a sample of 829 and 914 cases in the intervention and 
comparison groups respectively; the reconviction rates of these groups are 18.9 and 
26.0 per cent. This first comparison shows that there is a far higher rate of attrition in 
the intervention group (17.1%) than in the comparison group (8.6%) (reasons for this 
are discussed later).  
The question arises as to whether cases which do not match exactly should be 
included in the analysis. There could be two reasons why cases do not match. The 
first is that the reconviction data contained on the PNC does not in fact relate to the 
individual of interest. Although they have already been matched on name and date of 
birth, it is possible that they are not the same individual, and should therefore be 
excluded. The second possibility is that the reconviction data held on them are 
incomplete. It may have been that details of the target caution were incorrectly 
recorded on one or both of the databases,xiii or even not recorded at all. This means it 
would not be possible accurately to determine whether they have been reconvicted, 
and again such cases arguably should be excluded. On the other hand, it could be 
argued that insisting on an exact match between the two data sources (PNC and police 
records of cautions) is too stringent, and that the dates of some of the cautions may 
have been entered onto the PNC a day or so out. There is no right answer as to 
whether one should include only exact matches or close matches, and it is precisely 
this grey area which is the subject of the article. When researchers make decisions as 
to the acceptable parameters, they are also implicitly accepting that the rates of data 
attrition, and, as we shall see, of reconviction may differ as a result.   
If we widen the criteria so that any caution recorded on the PNC within a day of the 
intervention date is included, a further 27 individuals are located (interestingly, 26 of 
these are from the intervention group), and the reconviction rate of the intervention 
group increases by 0.3 percentage points.   
Obviously one can widen the criteria even further in an attempt to reduce the level of 
data attrition. Thus, if one decides that any caution recorded on the PNC within one 
month of the date of intervention is a match , then the sample size increases to 876 
and 925 cases in the intervention and comparison groups, while the reconviction rates 
increase to 19.9 and 26.2 per cent respectively. One can further increase the sample 
size by substituting for those offences where the date of offence was missing, the date 
of conviction this adds only nine more offenders (eight of whom were in the 
intervention group).   
The criteria could be relaxed indefinitely; however, as one does this, the risk increases 
of wrongly identifying a sanction as a target conviction, when it may in fact be a 
previous conviction or reconviction. The parameters described above rely on writing a 
syntax (computer command) which is applied automatically to the data. One problem 
with syntax is that it can be difficult to cover every conceivable possibility. For 




example, a caution date may have been incorrectly entered on one database as 
03/01/1999 instead of 03/11/1999, and this would not be identified as matching the 
intervention caution date if one used syntax which simply looked for cautions within a 
month either side of the target date. For this reason, a visual comparison was made of 
the remaining cases where there was no match within one month of the target date, 
and a judgment was made as to whether the case should be included (the example 
above was included). Such visual comparisons resulted in the addition of a further 
eight cases which had not been picked up by other methods, resulting in samples of 
891 and 927 and reconviction rates of 20.8% and 26.3% in the intervention and 
comparison groups respectively.     
Table 1 summarises the results of the analyses previously described, and gives the 
sample size and reconviction rates for both groups.   
T ABLE 1 
Summary of results: sample size and reconviction rates by type of analysis   
Intervention group Comparison group Criterion  
N. in sample % reconvicted N. in sample % reconvicted 
% point 
difference 
Court date exact 829  18.9 914 26.0 7.1 
+/- one day 855  19.2 915 26.0 6.8 
+/- seven days 868  19.4 921 26.1 6.7 
+/- 30 days 876  19.9 925 26.2 6.3 
Based on date 
of conviction 
884  20.4 926 26.2 5.8 
Based on visual 
comparison  
891  20.8 927 26.3 5.5 
The first point to note is that even though identical procedures were applied to both 
groups, the rate of data attrition varied significantly. For example, 17.1% of cases in 
the intervention group could not be matched exactly, compared to just 8.6% in the 
comparison group. Thus even before any variations of approach to data cleaning were 
made, a differential rate of attrition existed.      
It is important to know, when assessing internal validity, whether those lost to 
analysis differed from those who were matched, in terms of variables predictive of 
reconviction. Of those whose court date could not be matched exactly, just 4.7% were 
female, compared to 18.7% of those retained. In respect of age, missing offenders 
were significantly younger (by 3 ½ years) than those retained. Although it is not 
possible to calculate an accurate reconviction rate for those missing,xiv one can look at 
how many times they had been cautioned or convicted in total, and this reveals that 
they had received almost twice as many sanctions as retained offenders (5.2 compared 
to 2.7). What this suggests is that the differential rate of data attrition is likely to affect 
the validity of the results. This is because in the intervention group, there were more 
than twice as many missing cases, and as these were more likely to be reconvicted (as 
being young, male and having multiple convictions are all associated with a higher 
probability of reconviction), the reconviction rate based on exact matches is likely to 
be an underestimate of that group as a whole.    




The second finding from the table is that the difference in reconviction rates between 
the two groups varies according to which data cleaning criteria have been applied. For 
example, in the intervention group, the reconviction rate increased from 18.9% for 
exact matches to 20.8% for manual matches (an increase of 1.9 percentage points). By 
contrast, in the comparison group the respective rates changed from 26.0% to 26.3% 
(an increase of just 0.3 percentage points). This is because most of the additional 
cases included as a result of relaxing the criteria were from the intervention group, 
and most of these were also reconvicted. As can be seen from the final column, this 
meant that the difference in reconviction rates between the two groups declined from 
7.1 to 5.5 percentage points, a decrease of 1.6 percentage points. While this may not 
seem a particularly large difference, the fact there is any difference at all provides 
evidence that data cleaning can reduce internal validity. Secondly, if one considers 
that interventions may reduce reconviction rates by just a few percentage points, it is 
clear that the spurious difference caused by data cleaning could result in a failure to 
detect a real intervention effect, or alternatively, result in the detection of an effect 
where one does not exist. The smaller the sample size of a study, the more likely this 
is to be a problem.   
We have seen that changing the criteria for data cleaning can result in differential 
changes to reconviction rates. How might this occur? Although it was not possible to 
explore this empirically (for example through interviews with those in police forces 
responsible for entering data onto the PNC, or by examination of data entry 
procedures), it seems plausible that it arises due to a combination of, firstly, the 
differences in the accuracy of data entry between forces and, secondly, the systematic 
differences between those lost to analysis and those retained (described above). It is 
well known that PNC data suffer from problems of accuracy and completeness 
(Russell, 1998). A recent Home Office report found differences in working practices 
between police forces and variable levels of compliance with national standards on 
PNC data entry which adversely affected data quality. It went on to argue that the 
current inconsistent approach across police forces impacts adversely upon any 
organisation dependent upon the data . (Home Office 2005, p. 5). The consequence 
for researchers is that the accuracy of the data is likely to vary by police force area, 
resulting in differing levels of data attrition. This would not necessarily be a problem 
were the cases for which data were missing distributed at random. However, as we 
have seen above, cases lost to analysis tend to have characteristics predictive of a 
higher rate of offending than those retained.     





Before considering the implications of the results, it should be noted that there are a 
number of potential limitations to the analysis. Firstly, the results are derived from the 
data set of one reconviction study relating to just two police forces, and it is possible 
that these results are unique to these two forces. However, the findings of the Home 
Office (2005) report referred to in the previous section suggest that this is unlikely to 
be an isolated example.   
Secondly, the analysis was based on PNC data, and may not be generalisable to the 
other main source of reconviction data the Offenders Index. Again, there is no 
reason to believe that this should be the case. Following a comparison of the two data 
sources, Friendship et al found that neither source proved more reliable (Friendship 
et al 2001, p. 21). What we do not know, of course, is whether a greater or lesser 
effect would have been found had OI data been used instead.   
Thirdly, the analysis presented above represents a considerably simplified version of 
the reality of conducting reconviction studies and of the impact that data attrition can 
have. I have concentrated solely on the effect that data cleaning by researchers can 
have on data attrition. I have not explored the attrition which can occur before 
researchers obtain their data. In the case of the reconviction study on which this 
analysis is based (Wilcox et al 2004), a substantial proportion of cases (between 12.7 
and 17.7 per cent, depending on the police force) were lost to analysis because the 
Home Office PNC section were unable to trace some offenders on the basis of the 
identifiers (name, date or birth and PNC number) we had supplied. Given what we 
know about the characteristics of those lost to analysis (above), it is a distinct 
possibility that the attrition occurring at this early stage further reduces internal 
validity.   
Finally, it should be recognised that the generalisability of these findings is somewhat 
limited, as this type of threat to validity is not inevitable. It is only likely to occur in 
studies where the intervention and comparison groups originate from different 
administrative areas; in other words where data relating to the two groups are 
collected by different organisations or branches of organisations. In the example used 
here they were different police forces. Similarly if the groups were from different 
probation service areas or local authorities one might expect to see a similar effect. 
However, if both groups were from the same area, as might be the case in a 
randomised trial, for example, data attrition would be a less plausible threat to internal 
validity. Although the analysis here related to reconviction studies, the threats to 
internal validity demonstrated here could apply to other types of evaluation which 
depend on the accuracy of different datasets. For example, many situational crime 
reduction initiatives are evaluated using geographic information systems (GIS) in 
which the geographic locations of crimes are compared to the locations of crime 
prevention initiatives such as CCTV (Hirschfield, 2005). Errors in either dataset could 
threaten internal validity in much the same way as in reconviction studies.   
In brief, the magnitude of the effect of data cleaning on reconviction rates as revealed 
in this analysis may be unrepresentative of the population of reconviction studies. 
However, as the aim was to test the hypothesis that data cleaning made no difference 
to reconviction rates, the size of effect is immaterial. An effect has been found, and 




the hypothesis can be rejected. The results of this small study show that bias can 
unwittingly be introduced as a result of the routine cleaning of data which is an 
essential part of the conduct of a reconviction study. In the concluding section, the 
implications of the results are discussed and some solutions proposed for future 
practice.   




Conclusions, Implications for research, and the way forward  
Maltz noted over 20 years ago that: There are so many possible variations in the 
method of computing recidivism that one doubts if more than a handful of the 
hundreds of correctional evaluations are truly comparable (1984, p. 22). Seemingly, 
this finding holds true today: data preparation can make a difference to the 
reconviction rate. This may not necessarily be a large one, but the fact remains that 
even if identical criteria are applied to both groups, the rates of attrition and thus 
reconviction of one may be more affected than the other. This poses a threat to 
internal validity. The threat is likely to be significant if the overall differences in 
reconviction rates between groups are not themselves very large. In such cases data 
cleaning could result in a spurious finding of a treatment effect (or an obscuring of a 
real treatment effect).   
The findings of this study have a number of implications for the conduct and 
interpretation of reconviction studies. Firstly, researchers should be more cautious 
when making comparisons between the reconviction rates of different studies. We 
have seen that the assumption that the reconviction rate is unaffected by data cleaning 
is not a valid one. In a reconviction study of final warnings, for example, the 
reconviction rates of offenders in four youth offending teams were compared to the 
reconviction rates of a national sample of cautions, and the authors argued it is our 
view that this national sample of cautions is a reasonable comparison group and will 
offer appropriate indications of the success of otherwise of final warnings in 
preventing offending (Hine and Celnick 2001, p. 7). Given that the reconviction rates 
of the final warnings and cautions were calculated by two different sets of researchers, 
and that the groups were from different geographical areas, the validity of such an 
assumption is questionable.   
Secondly, if readers of a reconviction study are to be able to assess whether data 
attrition is a likely threat to validity, then the researchers conducting it need to be 
more explicit about the decisions they have made regarding data cleaning. In essence, 
this is a call to improve the descriptive validity (quality of reporting) of reconviction 
studies. When writing up the methodology, it should be noted, for example, whether 
cases that did not match exactly were excluded; whether cases were checked visually 
or only through syntax, and so on. Indeed, it would be a good idea for researchers to 
provide a range of reconviction rates (and associated rates of attrition) based on 
different methods of data cleaning. If a statistically significant treatment effect was 
found for each, then one could have more confidence in the results.   
Finally, it would be useful if further investigation could be conducted into the sources 
of error in PNC and OI data. Why, for example, are those with longer criminal 
histories more likely also to be lost to analysis, and why does data attrition tend to 
vary by gender? Consideration also needs to be given to what can be done to reduce 
the variability in (and improve overall levels of) data quality both between different 
criminal justice agencies and within those agencies. This would do much to negate the 
threat to internal validity that data cleaning currently poses. The practical difficulties 
in achieving universally accurate reconviction data should not be underestimated 
(Francis, Crosland and Harman 2002), and in the meantime, those conducting 
reconviction studies need to demonstrate transparency in the data cleaning process, 




and greater rigour in the reporting of methodology. Otherwise reconviction rates will 
remain any number you want .   




End Notes   
                                                     
i
 Reconviction data, on which reconviction studies are necessarily reliant, have well known 
limitations (Maltz 1984), not least of which is the fact that reconvictions represent an 
unknown, but smaller proportion of the amount of re-offending. However, alternative sources 
of data, such as offender self-report, also have weaknesses (Junger-Tas and Marshall 1999).  
ii
 The £400m Crime Reduction Programme, which ran from 1999-2002, is one example.  
iii
 In the six years 1993-1998, the Home Office published six reconviction studies, compared 
to 32 in the six years 1999-2004 (Wilcox 2005). 
iv In addition to the threats discussed in the main text, there is also a testing threat, in which 
the fact that a group took a pre-test causes an observed difference on the post test. In other 
words individuals may perform better on a post-test not because of the effect of the 
intervention, but because the pre-test primed them to perform better at the second time of 
testing (Cook and Campbell 1979). IQ tests are a good example of this. However, in 
reconviction studies, testing is not a plausible threat, because the measurement of the outcome 
(reconviction) is carried out without the involvement of the offender (i.e. through official 
records). In other words, the fact of measuring someone s previous convictions is unlikely to 
affect their rate of subsequent convictions.  
v
 The term intervention attrition is used in preference to attrition, to distinguish from data 
attrition (see below). 
vi In medicine, this is known as intention to treat analysis.  
vii
 Interviews were conducted under condition of anonymity.  
viii
 With PNC data, each offence (row) generates over 30 variables, including type, length and 
size of disposal, name and offence group of the offence and date of offence, charge and 
conviction. A similar number and type of variables are produced in OI output. 
ix
 Using the random sample function in SPSS. 
x In fact, the Home Office had not been able to trace around one fifth of the cases. Non-
tracing is another source of data attrition. The importance of this point is discussed in the 
conclusion.  
xi
 Syntax is computer code used to manipulate or analyse data. An example might be to recode 
age recorded in years to a variable containing five age bands.  
xii Similar results obtain if the period selected is 24 months, although evidently the 
reconviction rates are higher. 
xiii
 There is no reason to believe that one database is more accurate than the other. 
xiv By definition, those missing from analysis do not have a matching target date and so one 
does not know where to start counting reconvictions from. This is because we do not know 
which of the databases (PNC or local police record of cautions) is inaccurate in any particular 
case.               
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